Robert Muggah_Article_Donald Trump

Just 45 days into his 1,461 day term, President Trump is determined to expand U.S. influence across the Americas. He believes that he has the mandate and raw military and economic power to remake the hemisphere on his own. Instead of distinguishing between allies and enemies or democrats and autocrats, the Trump administration divides the world into the strong and weak. They are channeling Thucydides who, when speaking of Athenian imperialism, observed that “the strong will do as they will, and the weak will do as they must.” 

Within weeks of assuming office, Trump and his team implemented a series of protectionist measures that have sent global markets tumbling across the U.S., Europe and Asia. On March 4, the administration imposed 25 percent tariffs on all imports from Canada and Mexico, alongside a 20 percent tariff on Chinese goods. These moves triggered swift retaliatory action from Canada and China, with Mexico to follow. Despite suggestions from the U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick that tariffs will be eased, there are heightened fears of a sustained trade war with far-reaching global consequences. 

Trump’s aggressive threats of tariffs underscores not just an "America's First", but a broader "Americas’ First" foreign policy. It is reminiscent of nineteenth and early twentieth century doctrines advanced by the likes of former presidents Monroe, Polk, McKinley, Jackson, Roosevelt and Wilson, all of which promoted U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. The current administration's focus on issues slowing the flow of drugsmigrants, and redressing real and perceived trade imbalances has led to a resurgence of interventionist rhetoric with historical precedence. And while the latest shift marks a departure from relative disengagement for much of the twenty-first century, it nevertheless raises concerns across the Americas of the U.S.’s past meddling across Latin America and the Caribbean. 

The appointment of Marco Rubio, a Cuban American, as Secretary of State signals the administration's intensified interest in Latin America and the Caribbean. Rubio's inaugural diplomatic tour last month included visits to Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, marking a historic first for a U.S. Secretary of State. He is also joined by several Trump administration officials with interests in the Americas including Deputy State Secretary Chris Landau, National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, and former National Security Council senior director for Western Hemispheric Affairs Mauricio Claver-Carone. Their focus on the region speaks to the administration's desire to reassert regional influence, though potentially at the expense of traditional regional alliances.

Canada, long considered the U.S’s closest ally, now finds itself radically at odds with its neighbor due to the newly imposed tariffs. These measures threaten to disrupt deeply integrated supply chains, affecting sectors from manufacturing to agriculture. The actual and potential impacts have sparked discussions within Canada about de-risking its dependencies on the U.S., including by diversifying trade partnerships, particularly with the European Union (EU). Canada’s largest pension fund is reportedly exploring diversification away from the U.S.. Not only has Trump upended the national electoral race in favor of the Liberal Party, it has united Canadians, including accelerating measures to reduce federal and interprovincial barriers to trade and triggering consumer protests against U.S. goods. 

Meanwhile, countries in Central America and the Caribbean are grappling with the implications of shifting diplomacy, sharpening competition, intensifying deportations and reduced U.S. assistance. While Trump tariffs are expected to exacerbate labor shortages and increase production costs in the U.S., they will also potentially diminish remittance flows vital to local economies to these regions. The U.S. administration's hardline stance on border security and migration has prompted concerns about potential destabilization. And while Trump’s actions risk amplifying resentment and political turbulence, they are not (yet) being met with mass protests or calls for regional solidarity as in the past.

At the same time, the political landscape across Latin America is shifting, with far right-leaning ideologies gaining traction (and the left crumbling in many areas). Figures like Argentina's Javier Milei and El Salvador's Nayib Bukele have embraced populist rhetoric akin to "Trumpismo," (and its corollary “anti-wokismo”) reflecting a broader regional drift toward conservatism. These trends, together with aggressive “mano dura” measures to crack down on organized crime (and reduced efforts on the part of the U.S. to fight corruption), raise troubling questions about the future of democratic norms and governance in these countries. And the U.S. classification of several cartels and gangs as “terrorists” also raises concerns for Mexico and others about infringements on sovereignty. 

China's extensive influence in Latin America adds yet another layer of complexity to the U.S.’s strategic posture. As the region's dominant trading partner, China's presence challenges U.S. efforts to reassert its hegemonic status. The administration's attempts to counter this influence involve pressuring nations to reduce Chinese dependencies, but such strategies risk fostering resentment and driving countries closer to Beijing (even at a time of political, economic and demographic challenges within China itself). After Marco Rubio demanded “immediate changes” from Panama to China’s “influence and control” over the canal, a Hong Kong-based company agreed to sell its stake in two key ports to a group led by U.S. investment firm BlackRock. Meanwhile, the US's deepening ties with Russia will also re-align partnerships across the region, raising still more questions about how it will engage with adversaries like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. 

Trump 2.0 has ushered in a period of heightened U.S. involvement in the Americas, characterized by protectionist policies and a reassertion of influence. Rightly or wrongly, the U.S. President is convinced that the key to success on the domestic front involves getting drugs and migration under control and manufacturing jobs back in the U.S. More controversially, he also appears to harbor expansionist ambitions, not least taking Greenland and potentially Canada “by force” if needed, a threat that Copenhagen and Ottawa take very seriously. While some of his measures aim to address long standing domestic issues in the U.S., they will also provoke economic disruption and geopolitical realignment, prompting both allies and adversaries to reassess their positions in a rapidly evolving landscape.

On the positive side, it is also possible that aggressive U.S. actions could inspire new forms of cooperation in a fragmenting world. While there are strong incentives for smaller and mid-sized countries to compete and engage in transactional behaviour, there are also opportunities for more solidarity and collaboration, including on issues of security, migration, trade, and climate policy. While shocked by the speed and severity of the U.S.’s moves, many countries are quietly signing-on to migrant deportation agreements. Behind the scenes, virtually all countries (and companies) across the Americas are exploring new partnerships, alliances and trading relationships, including with EuropeChina, India, as well as BRICS+ countries. Whatever the outcome of regional coalitions and domestic politics in the coming years, it is not clear that the U.S. will be the driving force, much less at their center.

The Robert Bosch Academy gathered together leading thinkers from across the Americas to reflect on the impact of Trump 2.0. The March 4, 2025 event was moderated by Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow Dr. Robert Muggah, with participation of Brian Winter (Americas Quarterly), Catherine Osborn (Foreign Policy), Doug Saunders (The Globe and Mail) and Carlos Alvarado (Tufts University). The above article summarizes parts of the discussion which were held under Chatham House Rule.

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