Europe on the Verge of a Right-Wing Breakdown

The European Parliament election took place June 6 to 9 against the backdrop of widespread expectations of a right-wing surge. Although the results both confirmed and reputed these predictions, a worst-case scenario remains a distinct possibility. 

In France and Germany, Europe’s two largest countries, the right-wing surge was confirmed. In France, Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) topped the polls with a 17-point romp over President Emmanuel Macron’s En Marche. 

Macron’s bets
Macron responded by calling snap parliamentary elections for June 30, which further underscored this lurch to the right and opened the way for a far-right government for the first time. Whereas in the first round, RN indeed topped the polls, in the second, a republican front united against it, and citizens followed suit. Macron’s bet partly paid off. The threat of a far-right government has been averted for now, although who will govern France in the months to come and whether they will succeed in delivering on policy in years ahead remains highly unclear. Even less clear is whether all this will weaken or strengthen the far-right in its bid for the presidency in 2027. The jury is still out.  

In Germany, all three parties of the governing coalition took a beating while the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) placed second after the Christian Democrats. The electoral maps of France and Germany are stunning: in the former, the brown colour showing the RN’s victory is ubiquitous; in the latter, the east-west cleavage is deeper than ever with the AfD tightening its grip on eastern Germany. In other European countries, such as Italy and Austria, the far-right also topped the polls. Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) was among the few governing parties that raised its tally.
   
A limited surge
Yet, the narrative of a Europe-wide right-wing surge in most European countries and at the EU level is flawed. In Poland, Donald Tusk, prime minister and leader of the Civic Platform party, affirmed its leadership with a victory over the hard-right Law and Justice. In the Netherlands, the opposition socialist-green alliance placed first, overtaking Geert Wilders’ far-right Party for Freedom (PVV), which is now in government. In Spain, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Czechia, Bulgaria, and even in Hungary, the far right underperformed. In Italy too, while Meloni topped the polls at almost 29%, it is a far cry from rightist Matteo Salvini’s 35% in the 2019 European elections. Italy’s contribution to the right-wing surge is actually a net negative. All in all, the far-right made inroads, but not in a landslide: far-right parties in the Identity and Democracy (ID) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) groups in the European Parliament only increased their share of the vote from 20% to 24%. 

The “governing” majority in the European Parliament will likely remain the same, featuring the centre-right people’s party, social democrats, and liberals. Like last time around, this is insufficient for Ursula von der Leyen to be elected to a second term. She will need to win over others, too. The options available are the Greens and the hard-right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). 

The losers may have a say
The Greens, among the biggest losers in this election, may be more amenable to compromise than they were in 2019, and perhaps more willing to support von der Leyen. They have indicated as much. By supporting her they could salvage the European Green Deal, to which von der Leyen tied her name (although in recent months she seemed far too inclined to turn her back to it). The Greens probably will not ratchet up the EU’s net climate ambition, particularly not on issues such as agriculture reform and environmental protection. But they could keep pressure applied to the implementation of the EU’s current legal commitments on climate and the energy transition, while increasing climate finance, especially in the Global South. With the support of the Greens, the pro-European majority would hold. 
The alternative is to woo the ECR and in particular Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. Meloni has emerged as a clear winner from these elections, and von der Leyen may think that she cannot alienate the Italian prime minister, especially given the weakened positions of both Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Yet, as former President Jean-Claude Juncker stated in a recent interview, there is no need to have the backing of all governing parties. When he was elected Commission president in 2014, David Cameron’s Conservative Party (in the ECR group) voted against him. 
Isolate the right?

Moreover, the social democrats may insist on ring-fencing Meloni’s ECR. After all, the largest national contingent in the socialist group is the Italian Democrat Party, which garnered 24% of the vote, and it is highly unlikely to partner up with Meloni. And Meloni herself may be more inclined to play the Eurosceptic card, steering clear of von der Leyen and moving closer to other far-right parties, especially given the formation of the new group of “Patriots” led by Victor Orbán, which includes also the Spanish, Portuguese, Austrian, Dutch and Czech far-right. Especially if Le Pen’s RN were to join the group, it would easily become the third largest in the EP. Meloni, feeling squeezed between the centre-right and a group even further to the right, may tilt towards the latter. 

Thus far, Meloni has kept her cards close to her chest, and has avoided making choices. Over the last year and a half, she has acted as a moderate in Brussels and a radical in Rome. She supports Ukraine and remains firmly within the transatlantic fold, yet at home she unabashedly pursues a personality cult, the centralization of power, nationalism, the erosion of civil rights, and media freedoms. It is a balancing act that has served Meloni well, and she will no doubt try to extend it for as long as possible.
 
However, this balancing act will probably not last long. At the earliest, the moment of truth could come in mid-July, when the European Commission president will present her agenda in parliament, and will be voted in or out of office. It could last until the most meaningful elections for Europe this year: those on the other side of the Atlantic. Were Donald Trump to return to office there would be no reason to keep pretending. Toeing a pro-US and pro-Western line could become perfectly compatible with abandoning Ukraine and rowing back rights and freedoms within the EU. 

Perhaps Meloni will not need to make a clear-cut choice; perhaps extremists will succumb to pressure to moderate; and perhaps the EU will continue to muddle through. However, this European election should at the very least awaken us to the fact that things could go in a very different direction. And the worst possible possibility is that the EU’s proponents stick their heads in the sand and wish the problem away.