A growing yet overlooked threat: transnational organized crime in Germany

Long seen as a relative safe haven from the sprawling criminal networks entrenched across Europe, the country is now being forced to rethink its assumptions. Evidence of its vulnerability is mounting. These were the conclusions of an expert roundtable held on 27^th March 2025, bringing together 30 specialists from government, civil society, and academia.

Hosted by the Robert Bosch Foundation, in partnership with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Igarape Institute, the roundtable laid bare the scale of Germany’s challenges. As criminal networks grow more adaptive and sophisticated, the Global Organized Crime Index suggests the country’s resilience is weakening. Meanwhile, geopolitical and technological shifts are elevating organized crime from a law enforcement issue to a strategic security threat demanding urgent action.

The structural weaknesses enabling criminal networks

Germany’s responses to organized crime suffer from political expediency and institutional inertia. Counterterrorism dominates the security agenda, diverting resources away from fighting criminal syndicates. This is despite clear indications that organized crime is growing in scale and sophistication. Germany’s federal and state agencies tasked with tackling these networks are underfunded and overstretched. By March 2025, there were over 930,000 unresolved cases, a backlog that undermines the ability of law enforcement to keep pace with evolving threats.

At the same time, Germany’s decentralized governance structure hampers coordination between agencies. Criminal organizations exploit these inefficiencies, leveraging weak money-laundering enforcement, outdated legal frameworks, and limited investigative capacity. Asset seizure laws remain ineffective, with only 2% of illegally acquired assets successfully confiscated. Without urgent reform, Germany will continue to serve as an attractive hub for organized crime.

Challenges posed by mafia and clans

One of the most significant yet underappreciated threats comes from Italian mafia groups, particularly the ‘Ndrangheta. Germany has become a crucial operational base for this powerful criminal syndicate, with an estimated 3,000 members in the country. The ‘Ndrangheta alone generates an estimated €50 billion annually, a sum that dwarfs the budgets of many German law enforcement agencies. Meanwhile, drug markets have expanded significantly, with increased availability of cocaine, opioids, synthetic drugs, and crack. The rise of synthetic opioids has led to new addiction patterns and public health concerns. The structure of the drug market is also shifting, with volatile pricing, localized production of synthetics, and increased competition among criminal groups fueling violence and destabilizing established networks.

Germany has also witnessed an evolution in clan-based organized crime. Previously dominated by Lebanese-Kurdish clans, criminal activity now includes actors from Syria, Albania, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. These networks are decentralized, with younger generations less bound by traditional hierarchies and more globally connected through digital platforms. New entrants are more violent and unpredictable, contributing to growing instability within the criminal ecosystem.

Far from being confined to specific urban enclaves, clan-based crime has expanded across Germany, integrating into transnational supply chains that stretch across Europe. Many of these groups have been allowed to grow and fester owing to inconsistent police response. Crackdowns tend to be reactive rather than strategic, allowing these groups to regroup and adapt. Police often rely on outdated intelligence and assumptions, failing to recognize the generational and technological shifts that have reshaped criminal networks.

The rising threat of state-sponsored crime

Organized crime is no longer just a law-and-order issue—it is a geopolitical weapon. The Russian state’s involvement in organized crime presents a strategic challenge for Germany and Europe more broadly. Russia, in particular, has long incorporated criminal networks into its statecraft, using them as proxies for illicit financial flows, cybercrime, and even political interference. Russian criminal markets are highly globalized, serving as a “one-stop shop” for drugs, weapons, cyberattacks, and counterfeit goods. Russian proxies operate within Germany and across Europe, often without direct knowledge of their role in broader state-sponsored operations.

Since 2022, Western nations have expelled large numbers of Russian spies, but the Kremlin has adapted by using criminal proxies and ideological sympathizers as intermediaries. Russian actors engage in sabotage and political interference, leveraging criminal profits to finance destabilizing activities. China, Iran, and North Korea have also increasingly leveraged criminal proxies to further their geopolitical aims, making the intersection of organized crime and state-sponsored subversion a growing concern.

Risks of illicit financial flows and cybercrime

Germany’s financial infrastructure remains highly vulnerable to exploitation by organized crime. Despite being Europe’s largest economy, it lags behind in enforcing anti-money laundering laws. For example, just 2% of illegally acquired illegal assets are reportedly confiscated. Germany’s decentralized governance structure complicates enforcement hampering coordination between federal and state agencies. Criminal networks routinely exploit loopholes, using real estate markets, financial services, and cryptocurrency to launder billions of euros annually.  

Cybercrime has become a major driver of illicit profits, with ransomware attacks, encrypted communication networks, and dark-web marketplaces offering criminals new avenues to operate with impunity. Russian, Chinese, and North Korean actors have been particularly active in using cyber tools for both financial gain and political sabotage. Yet, Germany’s ability to counter these threats is constrained by legal and institutional barriers. Strict data protection laws hinder proactive surveillance, while law enforcement agencies struggle with a lack of technical expertise.

Germany’s legal framework for combating organized crime is outdated. Existing privacy and data protection laws make it difficult to track and disrupt criminal networks. Investigators are often required to delete organized crime-related data after a set period, limiting long-term intelligence gathering. Financial crimes, including large-scale tax evasion, frequently go unpunished due to the high burden of proof required under German constitutional law. Efforts to modernize asset seizure laws—bringing them in line with EU directives—have faced political resistance, slowing progress.

The shortage of personnel within Germany’s judiciary and investigative agencies further compounds the problem. There is an urgent need for specialized judges, prosecutors, financial crime investigators, and forensic analysts to tackle the complexity of modern organized crime. Without substantial reforms, the country’s legal system risks being perpetually outmatched.

Exploring solutions to strengthen Germany’s response

Germany must rethink its approach to organized crime. Experts at the roundtable emphasized the need to treat organized crime as a national security threat on par with terrorism. This requires a shift from reactive policing to intelligence-led strategies that prioritize dismantling criminal networks. A comprehensive approach, combining intelligence-led policing with social and ethnographic analysis of criminal networks, is critical.

Generate political support for preventing, detering and disrupting organized crime. At a minimum, political parties need to prioritize transnational organized crime and build public awareness. Field-research generated by civil society groups needs to be shared not just with the government, but also with society at large to drive a public conversation. 

Enhance the use of data-driven research. Official crime statistics (“Hellfeld”) capture only a fraction of illicit activities, leaving vast blind spots in policymaking. Greater investment in independent research and civil society-led analysis into underreported areas of organized crime (“Dunkelfeld”) is needed to map the full extent of the problem. Policymakers must also generate public awareness, ensuring that the fight against organized crime is a national priority.

Scale-up measures to target money laundering, strengthen law enforcement, modernize the judiciary. For example, Germany could align its asset confiscation laws with EU directives, allowing for more aggressive targeting of criminal profits. Repurposing confiscated real estate for social use could reduce the economic power of criminal networks. Anti-money laundering regulations could be updated, including increased penalties for financial crimes.

Modernize technologies to fight transnational organized crime. Criminal organizations have demonstrated remarkable adaptability, using encrypted communication platforms, courier services, and offshore financial networks to evade detection. AI-driven surveillance, blockchain analytics, and enhanced cross-border intelligence sharing should be central to any strategy to fight and disrupt cyber-enabled crime. However, these efforts must be balanced with robust safeguards to uphold privacy and civil liberties.

Support prevention strategies to address the underlying factors that drive young people into organized crime. Targeted interventions for at-risk youth to clans, for example, should start as early as nine or ten years old. Early prevention strategies, including community-based initiatives, should be expanded. Criminal penalties for violent and financial crimes should be increased, and enforcement of money laundering regulations should be prioritized.

Incentivize structured collaboration between government, civil society, and the private sector to confront the challenge of organized crime. A civilian observatory on organized crime, endorsed by the government but operating independently, could provide empirical oversight and policy recommendations. Public-private partnerships could help disrupt illicit financial flows, while structured intelligence-sharing agreements with international partners would bolster Germany’s response. 

Germany’s decentralized approach to fighting organized crime has fostered complacency. Despite the severe threats posed by organized crime, investment in enforcement and prevention lags behind counterterrorism efforts. A fundamental shift is required—one that recognizes organized crime as a direct challenge to Germany’s national security and economic resilience. 

Experts at the roundtable warned that Germany’s failure to confront organized crime reflects deeper weaknesses in its political and security institutions. Treating organized crime as a strategic threat—on par with terrorism and state-sponsored espionage—will require a fundamental shift in Germany’s political and security strategy. Without decisive action, criminal networks will continue to erode the country’s stability from within.

The Robert Bosch Academy gathered together experts on 27 March 2025 to reflect on this topic. The event was moderated by Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow Dr. Robert Muggah. The above article summarizes parts of the discussion which were held under Chatham House Rule.