Trump and Ukraine: Should we be worried?

December 2024

If the Trump administration takes the wrong path, the US will pay too.

 by Orysia Lutsevych

Orysia - QP Q4 2024

To make sense of what awaits Ukraine – and for the same matter, Europe – with President-elect Donald Trump is challenging, if not impossible. All the cards seem to be on the table. There is a cacophony of voices and a variety of groups, all with different advice.

Let’s start with what we know. Trump will seriously engage with Ukraine only if he can win. Otherwise, he will be disinterested. He does not want to be associated with “endless wars”.  Picture him getting the Nobel Peace Prize: this is the kind of win his team is talking about.   He wants to negotiate the end of the war. He said it many times, mentioning the losses on both sides (and these run up to a million in dead and wounded military personnel[1]). On the sidelines of his meeting with Zelensky in Paris, Trump called on both sides to agree to a ceasefire to open the way for talks.

We also know that Trump is likely to decrease military aid to Kyiv in the short term. That does not mean cutting Kyiv off. His foreign policy team, especially his nomination for state secretary, Marco Rubio, will want to prioritise the deterrence of China and the defence of Taiwan. Israel is likely to be more of a priority for delivery of military hardware than Ukraine. Thus, supplies might be re-directed away from Ukraine.  So far, Trump has not connected the dots between Russia, Iran, and North Korea, at least in his public statements.

But Trump is transactional. He will ask Kyiv: what’s in it for the US to continue backing you? 

Volodymyr Zelenksy’s team has shared its “victory plan” that includes access for American investors to its rare-earth minerals[2] and the possibility of buying more US weapons. A hint to what some deals may look like comes from Ukraine’s purchase of coal from Pennsylvania in 2017[3]. Kyiv is offering that the US invest in its defence-industrial base, which is starved for capital but rapidly innovates with drones and electronic warfare technologies. With proper war insurance and intellectual property rights protection, this industry could boom and be profitable for both sides. The US’s military kit has better chances on the world market if it has proven effective in Ukraine.

The risk to this plan is Russia. Putin recites unrealistic demands for negotiations[4]. His army pushes to occupy territory holding Ukraine’s precious natural resources. Many are located in or near active zones of combat. His war machine is fuelling the economy. Scaling it back could mean recession and the weakening of his power.

If Trump’s desires and ambitions are more or less clear, the pathway to achieving them remains mysterious. He has never specified more than that Putin would not have invaded if he had been in the White House instead of Biden. He also said that Joe Biden was weak and that the US should project strength.

Two groups will have his ear on the matter of Ukraine-Russia. The first is the established foreign policy circles: head of State Department to-be Marco Rubio, incoming U.S. National Security Adviser Mike Waltz[5], and Ukraine peace envoy Gen. Keith Kellogg[6].

The second camp is more worrying and includes his son Donald Trump Jr, right-wing presenter Tucker Carlson, and the nominee for the director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard. The latter is the most problematic as she tends to recite Russian disinformation and other outrageous propaganda against the US. It might well be that Trump is paralysed by the two camps’ conflicting strategies. This could push him to make impulsive decisions or shun any course of action of all.

Peace through strength

Ukraine might be the biggest victim of Trump’s reckless and transactional approach to the world. To mitigate these risks, Kyiv wants Trump and his team to embrace “peace through strength”. This is a longtime Republican concept, promoted by US President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s as policy against the Soviet Union. Ukraine’s diplomatic offensive to shape Trump’s views along those lines has started. The first official meeting between Trump and Zelensky took place in Paris in the first week of December and was brokered by President Emmanuel Macron. Andriy Yermak, Head of the Office of the President, met with Trump’s security team and Gen. Kellogg a few days before in Washington.

Ukraine is trying to convince Trump that the best incentive for Putin to negotiate in good faith is when his military position is threatened on the battlefield. I believe that Russian generals could compel the Russian political leadership to cut its losses and leave Ukraine. Only strong Ukrainian armed forces can proffer the leverage that can bring Putin to the negotiating table. Russians would retreat under pressure and evacuate their assets. Images of the Russian military leaving Syria[7] could be an inspiration for the outcome Trump could aspire to in Ukraine. 

The US could listen to Putin

One thing is also clear: the best way for Trump to fail is to agree to Putin’s terms for ending the war. This win could send a message to the world that the democratic bloc is weak, hypocritical, and in decline. The US would lose its confrontation with Russia. Forcing Kyiv to legally recognize territorial concessions or agree to a ceasefire without a solid defence agreement will mean the end of Zelensky’s rule and chaos in Ukraine. The Russians are already planning such a diplomatic trap for Trump. Will he decipher it quickly enough? Or fall for the fake bargain of great power deal?

I am worried about how all of this will play out. Too many lives are at stake and if Trump chooses the wrong pathway to end this war, more war may come to Europe.

That is why I joined a group of experts at Weiser Center for Europe and Eurasia[8] at the University of Michigan that is drafting recommendations for the Trump administration. We make the case[9] that “President Donald Trump has an opportunity to conduct a more effective pressure campaign against Russia and seek an end to the war. Doing so will thwart Russia and its allies and reduce the chances of World War III”.

Will President Trump exploit this opportunity?  Only time will show.

Orysia Lutesvych is the Deputy Director of the Russia and Eurasia Programme and Head of the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House London.


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