What Germany can learn from US elections

December 2024

The German Election Campaign’s Complicated Backdrop

by Laura-Kristine Krause

Laura - QP Q4 2024

There are few occasions when a society negotiates with itself: defining what is important to it or what its future should look like. Election campaigns are one of these rare moments. The year 2024 was marked by numerous important elections around the world and, due to the collapse of the German government, the 2025 general election will follow much sooner than expected. Germany has considerably less time to negotiate its own future.

Since August, I followed the US presidential election campaign on location in the US. The social dynamics there that fuelled the success of the Trump model have long since impacted other Western democracies. I come across them all the time at More in Common. In Germany, too, these dynamics will determine how anti-democratic populists perform in the votes – and the scope for democratic coalitions.

At More in Common, we examine social cohesion in Germany. We address the question of who is well integrated into society, who remains invisible, and how to reach the latter. To do this, it is important to keep an eye on the pace of social change and the shifting wishes of diverse social groups.

In the US, too, new and heightened social conflicts upset the presumed certainties about voter groups. The descendants of immigrants, for example, were previously part of the Democrats' core electorate. However, the majority of male Latinos voted for Trump, despite his condescending and discriminatory comments.  Arab and Muslim people also voted for Trump. Trump's campaign targeted precisely these voter groups with specific messages.

Just four years ago – during the coronavirus pandemic – the American working class saw Joe Biden as a guarantor of a better future. But Donald Trump took advantage of inflation and won those votes by a similar margin to Biden's victory over him in 2020.

German parties should be wary not to address just their own shrinking group of members or core voters. They would do well to strategically tap into new voter groups and pay more attention to people with migration backgrounds. Anti-democratic forces are already doing this: in the 2024 European election campaign, the far-rightist Alternative for Germany (AfD) spoke directly to young German-Turks in Turkish on TikTok.

In terms of social dynamics, Donald Trump's re-election was driven by two factors that are also present in Germany: dissatisfaction with the economy and a deep desire for change, including of the political system itself. The candidate who is most trusted on economic issues – and who succeeds in convincingly positioning themselves as a real change – is likely to win votes here, too. 

As in 2016, Trump succeeded in grasping the emotional state of his base and making a promise for the future. And even as a septuagenarian ex-president, he managed to position himself as thechange candidate. His opponent Kamala Harris, on the other hand, embodied the status quo, mainly because she had not sufficiently distanced herself from incumbent Joe Biden.

In Germany, the AfD and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) embrace a similar strategy when they present themselves as the only alternative to the supposedly uniform established parties, even though the German party spectrum is, in terms of content, broadly diverse. The Free Democrats (FDP) tried something similar as the opposition within the government. We will see on February 23 whether it works. 

Populist actors on the left and right are currently working to destroy trust in "politics", the state, and Germany as a business location because they themselves thrive off this very mistrust. In fact, in a healthy democracy the overriding prerogative should be to strengthen trust. Social cohesion depends on two levels of trust: people's trust in democracy and people's trust in one another. Once trust has been undermined it is very difficult to repair.

In this climate, it is a tricky balancing act for democratic parties to simultaneously engage in political competition and also maintain trust. Yet, since the announcement of the election date the focus has mainly been on tactical issues: election date, causes of the government’s collapse, etc. – and not on content. This hasn’t helped rejuvenate trust in the parties' ability to shape politics.

The early election date has complicated civil society’s engagement in the election.  Although these organisations do not campaign, they play an important social role through their input on election manifestos, participation processes, analysis of programs, voting machines, and campaign and information materials. This is important because the 2025 federal election will involve fending off a massive disinformation campaign from abroad, which could further damage trust in democracy.

What I remember most vividly from the US election is how much there is to do concerning trust between people. I found American society not only divided, but often voiceless, too. People didn't put up campaign signs because they didn’t want to talk to their neighbours. Families, colleagues, and friends no longer discuss political issues. This not only separates their worlds, but it also prevents people from perceiving “the others” as first and foremost people like themselves.

Germany faces a similar threat if it fails to organize encounters across social divides, promote social visibility, and secure shared information spaces. Politicians must create the parameters for this: for example, by robustly safeguarding public broadcasting, unlike what is currently planned by the federal states, who for example plan to severely limit the abilities of the public broadcasters to communicate with their viewers (and paying contributors) online and on social media, where however many of them can be reached these days. And: They have to set an example themselves. Those who dehumanize political opponents and resort to tactical games weaken democratic culture. Unlike the US, we still have some of that intact. The early elections give us the opportunity to show that we are prepared to protect this.

Laura-Kristine Krause is the founder and Executive Director of More in Common Germany. As a '24 Yale World Fellow, she was on the ground during the US elections in fall 2024.

You could also be interested in

Rebuilding US-German relations: Harder than it appears

The German government and many Germans breathed a sigh of relief when Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump in November. All to the good, but rebuilding the U.S.-German relationship could well prove more difficult than it first appears.

Read from an external site

The Multiple Dimensions of Climate Change

Confronting climate change requires considering its environmental, economic and social dimensions. Read how Laurence Tubiana, Ottmar Edenhofer, Samantha Gross, and Leena Srivastava assess one of the most important challenges of our time.

Read more

Divided Kingdom – How Brexit Is Remaking the UK's Constitutional Order

Amanda Sloat is a Robert Bosch Senior Fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is also a fellow with the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and...

Read more